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Consent, Forced Renegotiation and Expropriation in International Law

机译:同意,强迫重新谈判和没收国际法

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Expropriation is evolving. In recent times, host states with a desire to redraw the domestic status quo have demonstrated a tendency not simply to 'take' property from foreign investors by decree or proclamation. Rather, they are increasingly carrying out their objectives by murkier means; placing pressure on foreign investors to transfer control of their investments under threat of expropriation - that is, by forced renegotiation'. With the transfer taking place with the apparent consent of the investor, the host state muddies what was once perceived as a clear line between legality and illegality in international law. In this context, scholars and tribunals have failed to define properly the concept of 'consent' within the definition of expropriation. This has left considerable doubt hanging over the question of whether forced renegotiation can come within the expropriation paradigm.rnDetermining the existence or absence of consent is vital to determining whether an expropriation exists. After reasserting the importance of 'consent', this article identifies two divergent approaches to this much neglected issue. First, the 'broad' view of consent requires that a consent procured by duress is nevertheless a consent and prevents expropriation being made out. Alternatively, the 'narrow' view demands 'real and substantive' consent and rejects any agreement of the parties that is not free and informed. Each approach draws support from different comparative materials.rnThe article concludes that while state practice is consistent with the 'broad' view, the trend does appear to be towards adoption of the 'narrow' view, both in customary international law and in the BIT context. Nevertheless, even if the 'broad' view were to be adopted, the investor would not be left without remedy when subject to illegitimate pressure to vary its contractual arrangements. Investors may look for protection in either the bilateral investment treaty framework, which guarantees fair and equitable treatment and prohibits legally unjustified measures, or in what could be characterised as an emerging doctrine of compensable duress under international law.
机译:征用在不断发展。近年来,希望重新改变国内现状的东道国表现出一种趋势,而不仅仅是通过法令或宣布从外国投资者那里“夺走”财产的趋势。相反,他们越来越多地通过更黑暗的手段实现其目标。向外国投资者施加压力,使其在被没收的威胁下(即通过强制重新谈判)转移对其投资的控制权。在投资者的明确同意下进行转让后,东道国混淆了曾经被视为国际法中合法性与非法性之间清晰界限的东西。在这种情况下,学者和法庭未能在征用定义中正确定义“同意”的概念。这使相当大的疑问笼罩在强制征用协商范式是否可以纳入征用范式的问题中。确定同意的存在与否对确定征用是否存在至关重要。在重申“同意”的重要性之后,本文确定了针对这个被忽视的问题的两种不同方法。首先,“广泛”的同意观点要求以胁迫方式取得的同意仍然是同意,并阻止征用。另外,“狭'”观点要求“真实和实质性”同意,并拒绝当事各方没有自由和知情的任何协议。每种方法都从不同的比较材料中获得支持。文章得出的结论是,尽管国家惯例与“广义”观点一致,但在习惯国际法和BIT背景下,趋势的确似乎是朝着采用“狭义”观点发展。 。然而,即使采用“广泛”的观点,当投资者面临改变其合同安排的非法压力时,也不会没有补救措施。投资者可以在双边投资条约框架中寻求保护,以确保公平和公正的待遇并禁止法律上不合理的措施,也可以在国际法中将其视为新兴的可补偿胁迫理论。

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  • 来源
    《Arbitration International》 |2010年第3期|p.391-408|共18页
  • 作者

    OLIVER R.JONES; CHIDO DUNN;

  • 作者单位

    Brick Court Chambers, London Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia University of Sydney University of Sydney Bachelor of Civil Law University of Oxford;

    rnInternational Arbitration Group, Freshficlds Bruckhaus Deringcr LLP Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia University of New South Wales University of New South Wales;

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