The speed of employer learning and job market signalling revisited

摘要

This article discusses the claim made by Altonji and Pierret (AP) (19971. Altonji, J. G. and Pierret, C. 1997. “Employer learning and the signaling value of education”. In Industrial Relations, Incentives and Employment , Edited by: Ohashi, I. and Tachibanaki, T. 159-95. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. View all references) and Lange (20072. Lange, F. 2007. The speed of employer learning. Journal of Labor Economics , 25: 1-36. [CrossRef], [Web of Science ®]View all references) that a high Speed of Employer Learning (SEL) indicates a low value of Job Market Signalling (JMS). It is first discussed intuitively in the light of Spence's original model and then evaluated in a simple extension of a model developed by AP (19971. Altonji, J. G. and Pierret, C. 1997. “Employer learning and the signaling value of education”. In Industrial Relations, Incentives and Employment , Edited by: Ohashi, I. and Tachibanaki, T. 159-95. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. View all references). The analysis provided indicates that, if Employer Learning (EL) is incomplete, a high SEL is not necessarily indicative of a low value of JMS.View full textDownload full textRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2010.482514