The theory of two-sided matching markets has interested researchers for its theoretical appeal and relevance to real-life applications. The matching of medical residents and hospitals in the United States has been studied extensively by Alvin E. Roth (1984) and others. The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), the matching authority in the US hospital-resident matching market, runs a centralized matching mechanism that is a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm of David Gale and Lloyd S. Shapley (1962), redesigned by Roth and Elliott Peranson (1999).
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机译：双面匹配市场理论吸引了研究人员，因为它具有理论上的吸引力以及与现实应用的相关性。 Alvin E. Roth（1984）等人对美国医疗居民和医院的匹配进行了广泛的研究。国家居民匹配计划（NRMP）是美国医院居民匹配市场中的匹配机构，运行集中式匹配机制，该机制是David Gale和Lloyd S. Shapley（1962）延期接受算法的一种变体，该算法由罗斯重新设计。和Elliott Peranson（1999）。
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