Does personalized, salient information on future retirement benefits affect current retirement savings? Traditional models of household savings related to the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman 1957) and life cycle (Ando and Modigliani 1963) assume that individuals accurately forecast future earnings, benefits, and consumption when making current savings decisions. Even in these fully rational models though, individuals require information about future earnings and benefits to make optimal decisions. Modern behavioral economic theories, meanwhile, posit that individuals may not be able to complete such complex forecasts or be willing to take the required actions to implement their plans. In this case, information might counteract individual behavioral biases related to bounded rationality (Kahneman 2003), procrastination (O'Donoghue and Rabin 2001), or hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997). In both cases, economic theory suggests that information might change savings behavior. However, if changing savings decisions is perceived to be too costly or complicated, information may have no influence on actual behavior (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2011; Hastings, Madrian, and Skimmyhorn 2013).
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机译：有关未来退休福利的个性化重要信息是否会影响当前的退休储蓄？传统的家庭储蓄模型与永久收入假说（Friedman 1957）和生命周期（Ando and Modigliani 1963）有关，假设个人在做出当前储蓄决策时会准确预测未来的收入，收益和消费。即使在这些完全理性的模型中，个人也需要有关未来收入和收益的信息才能做出最佳决策。同时，现代行为经济学理论认为，个人可能无法完成如此复杂的预测，或者不愿采取必要的行动来实施其计划。在这种情况下，信息可能抵消与有限理性（Kahneman 2003），拖延症（O'Donoghue and Rabin 2001）或双曲线贴现（Laibson 1997）有关的个人行为偏见。在两种情况下，经济学理论都认为信息可能会改变储蓄行为。但是，如果认为改变储蓄决策的成本太高或太复杂，则信息可能不会影响实际行为（Choi，Laibson和Madrian，2011； Hastings，Madrian和Skimmyhorn，2013）。
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