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Coarse Grades: Informing the Public by Withholding Information

机译:粗略等级:通过隐瞒信息告知公众

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摘要

Certifiers of quality often report only coarse grades to the public despite having measured quality more finely, e.g., "Pass" or "Certified" instead of "73 out of 100." Why? We show that coarse grades result in more information being provided to the public because the coarseness encourages those of middling quality to apply for certification. Dropping exact grading in favor of the best coarse grading scheme reduces public uncertainty because the extra participation outweighs the coarser reporting. In some circumstances, the coarsest meaningful grading scheme, pass-fail grading, results in the most information.
机译:尽管质量认证机构对质量进行了更精细的测量,例如,“合格”或“认证”,而不是“ 100分中的73分”,但质量认证机构通常只会向公众报告粗劣的等级。为什么?我们表明,粗等级会导致向公众提供更多信息,因为粗等级会鼓励中等质量的人申请认证。放弃最佳等级,而采用最佳的粗略分级方案可以减少公众的不确定性,因为额外的参与超过了粗略的报告。在某些情况下,最粗糙的有意义的分级方案(通过/失败分级)会产生最多的信息。

著录项

  • 来源
    《American economic journal》 |2018年第1期|210-235|共26页
  • 作者

    Rick Harbaugh; Eric Rasmusen;

  • 作者单位

    Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, 1275 E. 10th St., Bloomington, IN 47405;

    Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, 1275 E. 10th St., Bloomington, IN 47405;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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