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首页> 外文期刊>Accident Analysis & Prevention >Can a road safety measure be both effective and ineffective at the same time? A game-theoretic model of the effects of daytime running lights
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Can a road safety measure be both effective and ineffective at the same time? A game-theoretic model of the effects of daytime running lights

机译:道路安全措施可以同时有效吗?日间行车灯效果的博弈论模型

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摘要

Studies that have evaluated the effects on accidents of daytime running lights for cars have consistently found that cars using daytime running lights are involved in fewer multi-party accidents in daylight than cars not using daytime running lights. However, studies evaluating the effects of mandatory use of daytime running lights have not always found an accident reduction. Although findings are mixed, there is a tendency for the aggregate effects of daytime running lights (i.e. the effects of an increasing share of traffic using daytime running lights) to be smaller than the intrinsic effects (i.e. the difference in accident involvement between cars using and not using daytime running lights). This paper presents a game-theoretic model to explain these apparently inconsistent findings. The game-theoretic model is based on so called Schelling-diagrams, originally introduced by Nobel laureate in economics Schelling. The effects of daytime running lights are modelled by means of Schelling-diagrams. It is shown that it is by no means impossible for cars using daytime running lights to always be safer than cars not using daytime running lights, while the total number of accidents remains constant even if the percentage of cars using daytime running lights increases from, say, 10% to 90%.
机译:评估汽车日间行车灯事故影响的研究一致地发现,与不使用日间行车灯的汽车相比,使用日间行车灯的汽车在日间发生的多方事故更少。但是,评估强制使用日间行车灯的效果的研究并不总是能够减少事故。尽管发现的结果参差不齐,但日间行车灯的综合影响(即使用日间行车灯的交通所占份额增加的影响)趋于小于其内在影响(即使用和不使用汽车的事故之间的差异)。不使用日间行车灯)。本文提出了一种博弈论模型来解释这些看似不一致的发现。博弈论模型基于所谓的席林图,最初由诺贝尔奖获得者在经济学席林中引入。日间行车灯的效果通过谢林图建模。结果表明,使用日间行车灯的汽车绝对比不使用日间行车灯的汽车更安全,而事故总数保持恒定,即使使用日间行车灯的汽车所占比例从,从10%到90%。

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