The Lazarillo of Tormes’ picaresque novel introduces a story where two subjects sequentially extract (one, two or three) tokens from a common pool in an asymmetric information framework (the first player cannot observe her partners’ actions). By introducing a reward for both subjects in case that in every period at least one subject had taken one single token, we define an interesting coordination game. We conduct an experiment with 120 undergraduate students to study their behavior in this framework. We find that if the second player is allowed to take more tokens than her partner, then the frequency of cooperators does not seem to be affected by the informational asymmetry. Nevertheless, this asymmetry (i) incentives the second player to use her ‘power of extraction’ while the social externality is still available, (ii) yields to more asymmetric profit distributions when subjects win the social externality and (iii) delays the breach period in case of coordination failure. Furthermore, the first choice of the first player is determinant for getting the reward.
展开▼
机译：拉姆萨罗（Lazarillo of Tormes）的怪诞小说介绍了一个故事，其中两个主体在一个不对称的信息框架中从一个公共资源池中依次提取（一个，两个或三个）令牌（第一个参与者无法观察其伙伴的行为）。通过在每个时期至少有一个受试者获得一个令牌的情况下为两个受试者引入奖励，我们定义了一个有趣的协调游戏。我们对120名本科生进行了一项实验，以研究他们在此框架下的行为。我们发现，如果第二位玩家被允许获得比其伴侣更多的代币，那么合作者的出现频率似乎不会受到信息不对称的影响。然而，这种不对称性（i）激励第二个参与者在仍然具有社会外部性的情况下使用其“提取能力”；（ii）当主体赢得社会外部性时，收益分配会更加不对称；以及（iii）延迟违约期如果协调失败。此外，第一个玩家的第一选择是获得奖励的决定因素。
展开▼
