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The Effect of Power Asymmetries on Cooperation and Punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

机译:权力不对称对囚徒困境游戏中合作与惩罚的影响

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摘要

Recent work has suggested that punishment is detrimental because punishment provokes retaliation, not cooperation, resulting in lower overall payoffs. These findings may stem from the unrealistic assumption that all players are equal: in reality individuals are expected to vary in the power with which they can punish defectors. Here, we allowed strong players to interact with weak players in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game with punishment. Defecting players were most likely to switch to cooperation if the partner cooperated: adding punishment yielded no additional benefit and, under some circumstances, increased the chance that the partner would both defect and retaliate against the punisher. Our findings show that, in a two-player game, cooperation begets cooperation and that punishment does not seem to yield any additional benefits. Further work should explore whether strong punishers might prevail in multi-player games.
机译:最近的工作表明,惩罚是有害的,因为惩罚会招致报复,而不是合作,从而导致总收益降低。这些发现可能源于所有参与者平等的不现实假设:实际上,人们期望个人惩罚惩罚叛逃者的能力有所不同。在这里,我们允许有能力的玩家与有能力的玩家在有惩罚的迭代囚徒困境游戏中互动。如果伴侣合作,则有缺陷的球员最有可能转向合作:增加惩罚不会带来额外的收益,并且在某些情况下,会增加伴侣背叛和报复惩罚者的机会。我们的研究结果表明,在两人游戏中,合作变得合作,惩罚似乎并没有带来任何额外的收益。进一步的工作应该探索在多人游戏中强惩罚者是否会占上风。

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