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Hospital Choice for Cataract Treatments: The Winner Takes Most

机译:白内障治疗的医院选择:获胜者最多

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摘要

>Background: Transparency in quality of care is an increasingly important issue in healthcare. In many international healthcare systems, transparency in quality is crucial for health insurers when purchasing care on behalf of their consumers, for providers to improve the quality of care (if necessary), and for consumers to choose their provider in case treatment is needed. Conscious consumer choices incentivize healthcare providers to deliver better quality of care. This paper studies the impact of quality on patient volume and hospital choice, and more specifically whether high quality providers are able to attract more patients. >Methods: The dataset covers the period 2006-2011 and includes all patients who underwent a cataract treatment in the Netherlands. We first estimate the impact of quality on volume using a simple ordinary least squares (OLS), second we use a mixed logit to determine how patients make trade-offs between quality, distance and waiting time in provider choice. >Results: At the aggregate-level we find that, a one-point quality increase, on a scale of one to a hundred, raises patient volume for the average hospital by 2-4 percent. This effect is mainly driven by the hospital with the highest quality score: the effect halves after excluding this hospital from the dataset. Also at the individual-level, all else being equal, patients have a stronger preference for the hospital with the highest quality score, and appear indifferent between the remaininghospitals.>Conclusion: Our results suggest that the top performing hospital is able to attract significantly more patients than theremaining hospitals. We find some evidence that a small share of consumers may respond to quality differences, therebycontributing to incentives for providers to invest in quality and for insurers to take quality into account in the purchasingstrategy.
机译:>背景:医疗质量的透明性在医疗保健中日益重要。在许多国际医疗保健系统中,质量透明性对于代表他们的消费者购买医疗保健的保险公司,提高医疗质量(如果有必要)的提供者,以及在需要治疗时选择消费者的提供者至关重要。明智的消费者选择激励了医疗保健提供者提供更好的护理质量。本文研究质量对患者数量和医院选择的影响,更具体地说,研究高质量的提供者是否能够吸引更多患者。 >方法:该数据集涵盖2006-2011年期间,包括荷兰所有接受白内障治疗的患者。我们首先使用简单的普通最小二乘(OLS)估计质量对体积的影响,其次我们使用混合logit确定患者如何在提供者选择的质量,距离和等待时间之间进行权衡。 >结果:从总体上看,我们发现,单点质量提高(从1到100)可将普通医院的患者数量提高2-4%。此效果主要由质量得分最高的医院驱动:从数据集中排除该医院后,效果减半。同样在个人层面上,在其他所有方面都相同的情况下,患者对质量得分最高的医院的偏好更高,而其余患者对这些医院的态度漠不关心医院。>结论:我们的结果表明,绩效最好的医院比医院能吸引更多的患者其余医院。我们发现一些证据表明一小部分消费者可能会对质量差异做出回应,从而有助于激励提供者投资质量,而保险公司则在购买时考虑质量战略。

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