Information Is Where You Find It: Perception as an Ecologically Well-Posed Problem

摘要

Texts on visual perception typically begin with the following premise: Vision is an ill-posed problem, and perception is underdetermined by the available information. If this were really the case, however, it is hard to see how vision could ever get off the ground. James Gibson’s signal contribution was his hypothesis that for every perceivable property of the environment, however subtle, there must be a higher order variable of information, however complex, that specifies it—if only we are clever enough to find them. Such variables are informative about behaviorally relevant properties within the physical and ecological constraints of a species’ niche. Sensory ecology is replete with instructive examples, including weakly electric fish, the narwal’s tusk, and insect flight control. In particular, I elaborate the case of passing through gaps. Optic flow is sufficient to control locomotion around obstacles and through openings. The affordances of the environment, such as gap passability, are specified by action-scaled information. Logically ill-posed problems may thus, on closer inspection, be ecologically well-posed.