Breaking and Fixing Origin-Based Access Control in Hybrid Web/Mobile Application Frameworks

摘要

Hybrid mobile applications (apps) combine the features of Web applications and “native” mobile apps. Like Web applications, they are implemented in portable, platform-independent languages such as HTML and JavaScript. Like native apps, they have direct access to local device resources—file system, location, camera, contacts, etc.Hybrid apps are typically developed using hybrid application frameworks such as PhoneGap. The purpose of the framework is twofold. First, it provides an embedded Web browser (for example, WebView on Android) that executes the app's Web code. Second, it supplies “bridges” that allow Web code to escape the browser and access local resources on the device.We analyze the software stack created by hybrid frameworks and demonstrate that it does not properly compose the access-control policies governing Web code and local code, respectively. Web code is governed by the same origin policy, whereas local code is governed by the access-control policy of the operating system (for example, user-granted permissions in Android). The bridges added by the framework to the browser have the same local access rights as the entire application, but are not correctly protected by the same origin policy. This opens the door to fracking attacks, which allow foreign-origin Web content included into a hybrid app (e.g., ads confined in iframes) to drill through the layers and directly access device resources. Fracking vulnerabilities are generic: they affect all hybrid frameworks, all embedded Web browsers, all bridge mechanisms, and all platforms on which these frameworks are deployed.We study the prevalence of fracking vulnerabilities in free Android apps based on the PhoneGap framework. Each vulnerability exposes sensitive local resources—the ability to read and write contacts list, local files, etc.—to dozens of potentially malicious Web domains. We also analyze the defenses deployed by hybrid frameworks to prevent resource access by foreign-origin Web content and explain why they are ineffectual.We then present NoFrak, a capability-based defense against fracking attacks. NoFrak is platform-independent, compatible with any framework and embedded browser, requires no changes to the code of the existing hybrid apps, and does not break their advertising-supported business model.