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The Experience of Pleasure: A Perspective Between Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis

机译:愉悦体验:神经科学与精神分析之间的视角

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摘要

Pleasure is more than a mere sensory event, but rather it can be conceptualized as a complex, multiform experience involving memory, motivation, homeostasis, and, sometimes, negative affects. According to Freud, affect is a perceptual modality that registers the internal drive state of the subject rather than the objective experience of the external world, and the quality of this perceptual modality is calibrated in degrees of pleasure and displeasure. Within this conceptual framework, the aim of drive is always pleasure, and objects become significant in so far as they provide a way of discharging drives pressure. Subsequent conceptual psychoanalytic developments have partially rejected such metapsychological theorizations, postulating that other intrinsic motivations that are independent from libido can be observed in humans. Intrinsic motivation broadly refers to a set of psychological concepts including the inherent propensity to pursue one’s choices, to seek out novelty and challenges, to satisfy curiosity and competence, and to extend one’s capacities and control over events. What these concepts have in common is an inner endorsement of one’s action, which is the sense that action is self-generated and is one’s own. The notions of pleasure, drives, and affects are all of utmost importance for a neuropsychoanalytic understanding of mental functioning, due to their capability to explain desire, thought, and behavior from the perspective of human subjective experience. The purpose of this paper is thus to discuss psychoanalytic conceptual developments that have addressed pleasure, drives, and affects, in the light of recent findings coming from neurosciences. In particular, we will explore for insights from Panksepp’s theory of primary-process emotional feelings, including the notion of “wanting” and “liking” as dissociable components of reward. In the last part of the paper, we will indicate possible theoretical implications for a neuropsychoanalytic understanding of libido-independent intrinsic motivations and their relationship with the self, including neuroscientific observations on self-related processes, agency, body-ownerships, and attachment.
机译:愉悦不仅仅是感官事件,而是可以概念化为一种复杂的,多形式的体验,涉及记忆,动机,体内平衡,有时还包括负面影响。弗洛伊德认为,情感是一种知觉方式,它记录着主体的内在驱动状态,而不是外部世界的客观经验,而这种知觉方式的质量是通过愉悦和不高兴程度来校准的。在此概念框架内,驱动的目标始终是乐趣,并且只要对象提供了释放驱动压力的方法,它们就变得很重要。随后的概念性心理分析发展已部分拒绝了这种超心理学理论,认为在人类中可以观察到与性欲无关的其他内在动机。内在动机广义上是指一系列心理学概念,包括内在的倾向去追求自己的选择,寻求新颖性和挑战,满足好奇心和能力以及扩展人的能力和对事件的控制。这些概念的共同点是对一个人的行为的内在认可,这就是说行为是自我产生的,并且是一个人自己的感觉。愉悦,驱动和情感的观念对于神经心理分析对精神机能的理解至关重要,因为它们具有从人类主观经验的角度解释欲望,思想和行为的能力。因此,本文的目的是根据神经科学的最新发现,讨论解决快乐,驱动和影响的精神分析概念发展。特别是,我们将从Panksepp的初级过程情感感觉理论中寻求见解,包括“想要”和“喜欢”作为奖励的可分离成分的概念。在本文的最后一部分,我们将说明对性欲独立的内在动机及其与自我的关系进行神经心理分析的可能的理论意义,包括对与自我相关的过程,代理,身体所有权和依恋的神经科学观察。

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