First time,the Section of 106 of the Corporate Law (2005) stipulates cumulative voting as the manner of election of the directors of the company. Although the provisions only accordance with international practice, they still win a lot of scholars and experts as well as small and medium-sized shareholders'enthusiastic appreciation. However, after careful observation, we can find that cumulative voting system violate the principle of equality of the shareholder of the company, and it has suspection of abandoning the principle of "one share,one vote". And from law and economic perspective, the cumulative voting system distorts the principle of the match of shareholders'residual claims and voting weights, which will lead to unnecessary agency costs. In addition, because of the significant heterogeneity,the elected directors may rendered the most efficient institution(the Board) of the company became the "Objection Church ", which is not conducive to the maximization of the shareholders'well-being as a whole. In terms of the external tender offer market, the introduction of the cumulative voting system will generate additional uncertainty and high cost of acquisition, and thus will weakening the efficiency of the market, which may result in non-optimal allocation of the resource.% 2005年《公司法》第106条首次写入了累积投票的公司董事选举方式，虽仅是依照国际通行的做法将之规定为任意性规则，但仍然博得了不少学者专家以及中小股东的热情追捧。然而，仔细观察之，累积投票制这一表决权规则违背了公司股东平等的原则，有背弃“一股一票”原则之嫌。并且，从法律经济学的视角考察，累积投票制扭曲了股东剩余索取权和投票权重相匹配的原则，将引发不必要的代理成本。此外，该选举制下产生的董事将具有明显的异质性，可能会导致公司原本最有效率的机构(董事会)成为“异议堂”，不利于股东整体福利的最大化。对于外部要约收购市场而言，由于累积投票制的引入，也会产生额外的不确定性和收购成本，从而弱化该市场的效率，导致资源的非优化配置。
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