基于迭代组合拍卖的排污权交易影响因素研究

摘要

This paper constructs an iterative combined auction model for initial emission right,and explores the impact of individual attributes and learning behaviors of polluting enterprises and the competition of auction on the allocation of emission rights through combining empirical weight attractor(EWA)learning model.The simulation results show as follows:the government could obtain higher profits when the number of polluting enterprises participating in the auction of emission rights is relatively large,the enterprises could obtain higher profits when the number of polluting enterprises is small;the more active the polluting enterprises in the auction adjust the pricing strategy in auction environment,the higher the profit of polluting enterprises;the more the choice of the enterprise's quotation strategy depends on its learning behavior,the higher the profit that the polluting enterprises could obtain from the auction.%构建了初始排污权迭代组合拍卖模型,并结合EWA模型探究了排污企业的个体属性和学习行为以及拍卖竞争程度对排污权分配结果的影响.仿真结果表明:当参与竞拍企业的数量较多时政府可获得较高收益,当参与竞拍企业的数量较少时企业可获得较高收益;排污企业在竞拍中随拍卖环境调整报价策略越积极,其收益越高;排污企业的报价策略选择越依赖其学习行为,其收益越高.