银行卡支付平台竞争绩效及其生存区间分析

摘要

Bankcard payment platform is distinct with an attribute of two-sided markets and the cross-network externality plays a decisive role in the pattern of competition. This article builds a two-stage game model to analyze the competition performance and survival interval between closed payment platform and open payment platform, only to find that the condition for co-existence of bankcard payment platform lies in the strength of cross-network externality. Once the strength of cross-network externality is either strong e-nough or weak enough, platform can survive together. However, if the strength of cross-network externality lies between a certain intervals, the winner will take all.%银行卡支付平台具有双边市场属性,其交叉网络外部性强度深刻地影响着整个电子支付行业竞争格局.研究采用一个两阶段博弈模型分析银行卡支付平台竞争绩效及其生存区间,结果表明“赢者通吃”并非银行卡市场的常态,平台共存的条件在于交叉网络外部性要么足够大,要么就是足够小.