单边纯捆绑的质量研发效应研究--基于电信竞争的视角

摘要

There are lots of theoretical studies on multidimensional economic effects of monopoly bundling,and it has quite a lot of cases in reality market.However,among many of the economic effects of bundling,the research on R&D effect is not rich.Based on the R&D effect of bundling on telecommunications competition,using a model of vertical differentiation, the paper studied the effects of pure bundling of monopoly’s independent products on market price and the competitive en-vironment under the market structure of “monopoly -oligopolistic market”,also studied the effect on R&D incentives of the competitive products when the market faces R&D competition.The study found that:The bundling of monopolist will bring more radical price competition,lower the market share and the profit of the competitor;under the conditions of independent sales,the R&D investment of monopolist is more than the competitor,but under the conditions of bundling,the R&D in-vestment of monopolist is less than the competitors’R&D investment.Therefore,bundling lowered the R&D incentives of monopolist relative to the competitor.%垄断企业捆绑销售的多维度效应已有不少理论研究，现实市场也不乏此类案例。然而，在捆绑的诸多效应中，对于研发效应的研究成果并不丰富。以捆绑在电信竞争中的研发效应为例，基于一个纵向差异化模型，在“垄断－寡头”的市场结构下研究垄断企业独立产品捆绑销售对市场价格、市场竞争性的影响，以及存在研发竞争时对竞争性产品研发激励的影响。研究发现：垄断企业捆绑销售都会带来更激进的价格竞争，降低竞争者的市场份额和利润；独立销售条件下垄断企业的研发投入大于竞争者的研发投入，捆绑销售条件下垄断企业的研发投入小于竞争者的研发投入。因此，捆绑降低了垄断企业相对于竞争者的研发激励。