＂有效契约论＂把高管激励契约看成重要的公司治理机制,有效的薪酬激励机制可以协调股东和高管的利益冲突,实现股东财富最大化。＂管理权力论＂则认为,高管对自己的薪酬安排有很大影响,可以利用自身权力以多种方式进行寻租。本文针对高管激励的上述两种假说,结合我国的制度背景,从上市公司设立薪酬委员会的动因、薪酬委员会对高管薪酬安排的影响两方面展开研究。以2001年至2008年深沪两市的上市公司作为研究样本,通过实证分析,我们发现,如果潜在代理成本越高,公司就越可能设立薪酬委员会,这与有效契约论的预期一致;同时,薪酬委员会的设立增强了薪酬-业绩敏感度。研究结论对健全薪酬委员会制度、有效发挥高管薪酬契约的激励作用以及规范上市公司治理具有借鉴意义。%The Optimal Contracting Hypothesis argues that the Board seeks efficient employment contracts, with terms that will optimally align management＇ s incentives with those of the shareholders, minimizing agency costs. Adherents of the Managerial Power Hypothesis contend that executives have too much power in determining their own compensation contracts and the rent-seeking incentives tend to destroy shareholders wealth. We investigate the validity of these two hypotheses by analyzing firms that voluntarily adopt a remuneration committee in an environment, China, where the formation of remuneration commit- tees is unregulated. And we further test the incentive effect of remuneration committee on CEO compensation. Our sample con- sists of firms from China firms from 2001 to 2008. After controlling for various other factors, we find that greater the potential agency costs is associated with a higher likelihood of remuneration committee adoption, supporting the premise of the Optimal Contracting and casting doubt on Managerial Power Hypothesis＇s alternative explanation.
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