群体性突发事件发生机理的多阶段动态博弈模型分析

摘要

Unexpected incidents involving mass participation become an important factor influencing Chinese softcial stability and modernization.Suppose that the vulnerable group considers the equity factor in its utility function as the private information, the economic income of social group changes in different phases, the partition of social strata is decided by the relative economic status, and the social group with bounded rationality takes the forward induction to engender the adaptability expectation.The paper builds the multi - phase dynamic game model, and then gets the conditions for the vulnerable social group to take the unconditional struggle strategy, actively concession strategy and actively struggle strategy, and two engendering mechanisms of unexpected incidents involving mass participation.The conclusion shows that the economic income increasing rate is an important factor of unexpected incidents involving mass participation, besides the sensitive degree of the vulnerable social group for pay disparity and the different expected incomes of social groups that take the different strategies in the current system.%群体性突发事件成为影响我国社会稳定和实现现代化平稳过渡的重要因素.假设弱势群体的效用函数考虑到公平因素的私人信息;不同时期各社会群体的经济收入是动态变化的;经济地位的差异决定了不同社会阶层的划分;冲突中"有限理性"的社会群体采取前向归纳法形成适应性预期,在此基础上构造了多阶段动态博弈模型,得出了弱势群体采取无条件抗争策略、积极妥协策略和积极抗争策略的约束条件,以及群体性突发事件的两种发生机理.除了弱势社会群体对社会分配体制造成的经济收入差距的敏感程度,社会体制(博弈结构)决定的各社会群体采取不同策略的预期收益以外,弱势群体的收益增长情况是影响群体性突发事件产生根源的另一个重要因素.