考虑长短期努力的过度自信代理人激励机制

摘要

This paper regarded "relative net profit" as performance measurement standards to design agent's compensation contracts.It established non-monetary utility measurement models and agent's optimal incentive model to explore the influence of various factors on agent's effort and performance share proportion,which took into account agent's overconfidence degree and his long-term and short-term effort,distinguished the conflict and non-conflict between short-term effort and long-term effort.It found four major conclusions as follows:First,agents in monopoly industries make less effort than ones in competitive industries and the greater the monopoly earnings proportion is,the less effort agents make.Second,the relationship between monopoly earnings proportion and performance share ratio is affected by overconfidence degree of agents and clients,that the greater the monopoly earnings proportion is,the higher the performance share proportion is when agent's overconfidence coefficient is higher than principal's,on the contrary,the conclusion is opposite when agent's overconfidence coefficient is lower than principal's.Third,the higher the agent's overconfidence degree to favorable condition and the lower to unfavorable position is,the greater the agent's effort and performance share proportion are;the higher the principal's overconfidence degree to favorable condition and the lower to unfavorable position is,the lower the agent's effort and performance share proportion are.Four,agent's effort is positive correlation with marginal non-monetary income and displays negative correlation with marginal non-monetary cost.%以相对净收益为标准设计代理人薪酬契约,同时考虑代理人过度自信及长短期努力水平,并区分长短期努力的冲突性与非冲突性,分别建立非货币效用计量模型和代理人最优激励模型,探索各项因素对代理人努力水平及业绩分享比例的影响.研究发现如下几点主要结论:第一,垄断行业代理人努力水平远远低于竞争性行业,且行业垄断程度越高,代理人努力水平越低.第二,行业垄断盈余比例与业绩分享比例之间的关系受委托人与代理人过度自信程度影响,当代理人过度自信系数高于委托人时,行业垄断程度越高,业绩分享比例越大,反之结论相反.第三,代理人对有利状态过度自信程度越高,对不利状态过度自信程度越低,代理人努力水平与业绩分享比例越高;委托人对有利状态过度自信程度越高,对不利状态过度自信程度越低,代理人努力水平与业绩分享比例越低.第四,代理人努力水平与边际非货币收益正相关,与边际非货币成本呈负向变化关系.