FIDIC合同条件下工程索赔的博弈模型

摘要

索赔是工程项目各参与主体共同关注的焦点,索赔决策直接影响业主方和承包方的利益.研究通过分析工程索赔的特性,结合FIDIC合同条件下的索赔条款,提出索赔的博弈基础;分析博弈论和贝叶斯法则与索赔决策之间的契合程度,构建工程索赔的基本博弈模型;基于工程索赔的四种情境,构建完全信息有限多轮博弈模型、资金时间价值对博弈模型的影响、不完全信息有限多轮博弈模型和非完全对立的不完全信息有限多轮博弈模型并求解"纳什均衡",模拟工程参与方做出索赔决策的路径,寻求相应情形下承包方和业主方的最优策略,提出工程参与方优化索赔策略的建议.%Claim is the common focus to each participant of the construction engineering and the claim decisions affect the interests of the owner and the contractor directly.As Chinese contractor taking part in more and more international construction projects,FIDIC contract conditions are arousing more attention than before,the claim clauses of which get wide recognition.This research locates characteristics of construction claims through the courses and classifications of FIDIC contract in order to establish the game model to analyze the claim strategy and decision path.Firstly,the research analyzes the matching degree between game theory,Bayes Rule and claim decision,then,constructs the basic game model of construction claim.Secondly,based on the four scenarios of construction claim,the research conducts respectively the game model of limited rounds with complete information,the game model under the influence of time value,the game model of limited rounds with incomplete information and the game model under not completely opposite.By solving the Nash equilibrium of the four game models,the research simulates the decision-making process to seek the optimal strategy of engineering participants.Participants should truthfully claim under complete information game.Under the incomplete information game,the contractor will adopt strategy to raise the claim amount,and the owner should refuse it to negotiate.In any case,all participants should take reasonable concessions to compromise the claim amount over negotiation.