首页> 中文期刊> 《运筹与管理》 >供应链互补产品广告投入和捆绑销售联合决策研究

供应链互补产品广告投入和捆绑销售联合决策研究

         

摘要

以一个制造商和一个零售商的供应链为研究对象,制造商生产两种互补产品,零售商可选择分开或捆绑两种销售策略.考虑互补品的负交叉弹性和广告外部性的特点,构建基于溢出效应的需求模型,运用博弈论的方法,求解零售商采取分开和捆绑两种销售策略时的均衡结果.通过比较不同销售策略下的均衡结果及利润关系,探讨在分散式和集中式两种情况下,零售商的最优广告投入和捆绑销售的联合决策问题.最后,通过数值算例,讨论产品互补程度和广告成本系数对决策结果的影响.研究结果表明,无论是在分散式还是集中式决策下,当产品互补程度较高或广告成本系数低时,分开销售是占优策略而广告费用较高;当产品互补程度较低且广告成本系数高时,捆绑销售是占优策略且广告费用较低.%This article studies a supply chain considering of a multi-product manufacturer and a retailer.The manufacturer provides two complementary products and sales them through a retailer.The retailer can sell com-plementary goods by two strategies: pure component and pure bundling.We introduce inverse line demand functions by taking into account the product cross elasticity and spillover effect,and employ a Stackelberg game model to explore the retailer's optimal advertising and bundling jointed decisions in a decentralized or centralized supply chain.And the numerical example is used to investigate the effects of product complementarities and ad-vertising cost on the jointed optimal decisions.The research indicates that both in a decentralized or centralized supply chain,the optimal advertising expenses of complementary goods are lower when the retailer takes a pure bundling sale strategy instead of taking a pure component.And,for the retailer,when the complementarities are high or the advertising cost is low, the pure component is a dominant strategy; when the complementarities are moderately low and the advertising cost is high,the pure bundling is the optimal strategy.The results offer some guidance to the retailer's advertising and bundling joint decisions.

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