首页> 中文期刊> 《天津商业大学学报》 >经济责任审计促进经济增长的微观途径--基于“中国之谜”中政府官员的作用

经济责任审计促进经济增长的微观途径--基于“中国之谜”中政府官员的作用

         

摘要

A bstract:The special system background and incentive structure faced by Chinese local government officials, and the“championship system”formed by this form, constitute the important foundation of China’s over-normal economic growth. Based on the interpretation of the role of government officials in the“China puzzle”, this paper tries to explain the micro approach of economic responsibility auditing system, which has distinct Chinese characteristics, for promoting economic growth. Studies suggest that, by exercising audit supervise power, the economic responsibility audit correct the distortion of official incentive by using the audit evaluation mechanism, prevent and discover corruptions, strengthen the“imputation”mechanism to clear away the obstacles of economic growth and ensure the continuity of the region’s economic construction, which is an important supportive institutional arrangements to promote economic growth.%我国地方政府官员面临的特殊制度背景和激励结构,以及由此形成的“锦标赛体制”,构成了中国经济超常规增长的重要制度基础。本文通过对“中国之谜”中政府官员作用的解读,试图阐释具有鲜明中国特色的经济责任审计制度促进经济增长的微观途径。研究认为,经济责任审计通过依法行使审计监督权,以审计评价机制纠正官员激励扭曲,以防止和发现腐败,强化官员“归责”机制为经济增长扫清障碍,保证地区经济建设的连续性,是促进经济增长的重要支持性制度安排。

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