一体化的内部资本市场并不能在事前承诺事后不会重新配置资本给那些获利更为稳妥的研发项目，而非一体化的组织可以在事前对研发项目承诺资本配置的数量。因此，一体化较之于非一体化有着资本投资事前不可合同化的理论特征。这一理论特征及其概念延伸在很大程度上决定着研发的最优组织以及企业的最优边界。更为深入地， M-R模型遵循上述逻辑主线，从研发竞赛与多渠道研发外包的视角考察了潜在一体化者与研发单位的最优组织问题；鉴于内部资本市场资本配置的不可合同性可衍生出对创新失败较低的容忍度，而Canidio&Legros(2016)意义上的学习机制可以使非一体化对应于对创新失败较高的容忍度，对项目经理而言，如果对创新失败宽容更为利好，那么最优的研发组织很可能是非一体化。%Internal capital market of integration cannot commit not to reallocate capital to the less uncertain R&D project , but the organization of non-integration can commit to allocate capital to a given R&D project. Therefore, compared to non-integration, integra-tion and its internal capital market has the characteristic of non-contractibility with respect to allocating capital. The characteristic and its modifications determines the optimal organization of R&D and the optimal firm boundary to a great extent. More deeply , the model of M-R discusses the optimal organization of R&D between a potential integrator and an R&D unit by following the above logic line and from the perspective of R&D race and dual-channel R&D outsourcing;since lower tolerance of failure of innovation can be derived from the characteristic of non-contractibility of internal capital market and learning in sense of Canidio&Legros(2016) can make non-integr-ation correspond to higher tolerance of failure of innovation, as for the manager of a R&D project, if higher tolerance of failure of inno-vation is more profitable, then it is likely that the optimal organization of R&D is non-integration.
展开▼
