不同权力结构对跨境电商双渠道供应链的影响

摘要

Considering an e-retail supply chain composed of a foreign supplier and a cross-border e-retailer,a dual-channel demand model for the cross-border e-retailer is established based on the theory of consumer surplus.The paper discusses the cross-border e-retailer's dual-channel pricing decisions through comparing the profits under centralized and decentralized pricing modes.Then,it analyzes the impact of three power structures on supply chain participants' pricing decisions,demands,and profits through constructing the foreign supplier Stackelberg game,cross-border e-retailer Stackelberg game and Nash game models.The results show that the impacts of the two Stackelberg games on the cross-border e-retailer's prices and demands and supply chain's total profits are identical;the impacts of three games on offline channel demand are identical.In Nash game,online channel demand and supply chain's total profits are the highest;the overseas supplier's wholesale price and profits and the cross-border e-retailer's profits decrease with the decline of the game dominance in the three games.%在单个境外供应商和单个拥有线下线上双渠道的跨境电商组成的供应链中,基于消费者剩余理论,构建了跨境电商双渠道需求模型,通过比较集中和分散两种定价模式下跨境电商的利润,探讨了跨境电商双渠道零售模式的定价决策问题.在此基础上,构建境外供应商主导的Stackelberg博弈,跨境电商主导的Stackelberg博弈及同等权力的Nash博弈模型,分析了三种博弈权力结构对供应链成员价格,需求和利润的影响.研究发现,跨境电商(境外供应商)主导的Stackelberg博弈对跨境电商线下线上双渠道价格,需求及供应链总利润的影响是无差异的;三种博弈策略对跨境电商线下渠道需求的影响是无差异的,Nash博弈下,跨境电商线上渠道需求及供应链总利润最大;三种博弈策略下,境外供应商批发价格,利润及跨境电商利润随其博弈主导地位下降逐渐降低.