公司治理通过监督和激励机制来控制经理人的机会主义行为,使经理人有效配置资源,从而影响R&D项目的执行效果,最终影响企业绩效,公司治理自然被作为R&D投入与企业绩效关系的调节变量引入.基于委托代理理论,从理论上论证公司治理是如何调节R&D投入与企业绩效的关系,并且提出相应假设,选取中国A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,利用层次回归方法和分组分析方法,检验机构投资者、国有控股、董事会、经理层股权激励对R&D投入与企业绩效关系的调节效应.检验结果表明,机构投资者和独立董事对R&D投入与企业绩效没有调节作用,机构投资者与企业绩效有显著的直接关系,国有控股、董事会会议强度对二者关系有负向调节作用,经理层股权激励对二者关系有正向调节效应.从检验结果可以看出,R&D活动严重的信息不对称性和高度的专业性使得对其监督的难度比较大,通过给经理人一定的股权,使他们成为股东,用激励机制解决R&D活动中的代理问题可能效果更好.%Corporate governance can control managers' opportunism behavior by supervision and motivation measures to make managers allocate resourses effectively, which will influence operation of R&D project and affect corporate performance in the end. Thus corporate governance has been introduced as a moderating variable of R&D input and corporate performance naturally. This paper firstly demonstrated how corporate governance influence the relationship between R&D and firm performance, and gave assumptions based on, principal-agent theory. Then, using Chinese listed manufacturing firm's data, this paper tested the moderating effects of institutional investors, state holding, board of directors, managerial ownership on the relationship between R&D input and firm performance by hierarchical regression and subgroup analysis. Results show that institutional block holder and independent directors have no moderating effect and institutional block holder has significantly direct correlation with firm performance; State holding and board meeting moderate the relationship negatively; While managerial ownership moderate the R&D spending-performance relationship positively. We can draw the conclusion that it is difficult to supervise R&D activities due to its serious information asymmetry and high degree of professionalism and incentive mechanisms such as distribute some stocks to managers may be the better way to solve the agent problem.
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