关联交易、资产专用性与控股股东行为——基于仁和与天目的案例研究

摘要

Based on the asset specificity theory, this paper conducts a case study to investigate the positive effect of related party transactions between the listed companies and their controlling shareholders. By comparing two pharmaceutical companies in China, Renhe and Tianmu, it comes to a conclusion that if the controlling shareholders engage in the specific related party transactions with the listed companies, their exploitation of gains will be constrained due to the ＂bundling-up＂ effect. If there are few specific related party transactions with the controlling shareholders, there will be no effective binding, and therefore the risk of asset tunneling will oc- cur. The conclusions are important reference for the improvement of corporate governance of lis- ted companies and regulatory policies on related party transactions made by regulatory agencies.%本文以资产专用性理论为指导，运用案例研究方法，从一个新的视角探讨了上市公司与控股股东之间关联交易的正面效应。通过仁和与天目两家中国药业公司的对比分析得出，如果控股股东与上市公司进行了具有资产专用性的关联交易，根据资产专用性理论，捆绑效应可以抑制控股股东的利益侵占行为。如果具有资产专用性的关联交易不多，则可能不会对控股股东形成有效的约束力，进而控股股东便可能进行利益掏空。本文的结论对于上市公司治理的完善以及监管机构对关联交易的监管都具有借鉴意义。