从企业社会责任的一个方面——产品安全性能对消费者的影响入手,运用博彝论的基本思想,就安全压力下制销供应链联盟与消费者的关系进行了研究.结果表明:消费者组织斗争所产生的安全压力随消费者组织可用资金的增加而增加,危害随消费者认为制销联盟是好的概率的增加而减少；由于g类制销联盟的期望利润比b类大,因此即使消费者认为g类制销联盟是好的概率比b类大,g类制销联盟也可能比b类更可能成为施压目标而承受更大的安全压力；当目标制销联盟斗争成功的期望收益大于其斗争所需成本时,g类制销联盟和b类制销联盟都会选择斗争,即目标制销联盟斗争的意愿取决于他们斗争成功的期望收益；除非消费者认为g类制销联盟是好的概率足够大,否则g类制销供盟将被选择为施压目标；较强的消费者组织选b类制销联盟为施压目标,而较弱的消费者组织选g类制销联盟为施压目标.结论对供应链的制销决策以及消费者组织的施压决策具有重要的指导意义.%Profit optimization decisions usually do not consider product safety responsibility. Although enterprises can enjoy short-term profit, they cannot deliver long-term benefit. The existence of enterprises can be threatened if product safety responsibility problems surface. Therefore, it is important to analyze the relationship between supply chain alliance and consumers under the pressure of product safety and provide important guidance for supply chain partners and consumers.A supply chain model consists of manufacturer, distributor and consumers. We divide manufacturers into two categories "g" and "b". Manufacturers in category "g" fulfill safety responsibilities, whereas manufacturers in category "b" do not. Product safety performance can influence a consumer's preference from the perspective of corporate social responsibility. This paper adopts the game theory to investigate the relationship between manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance and consumers under the pressure of product safety responsibility.First, this paper reviews literature on the profit coordination model for manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance and on the preference of consumers for product safety. The study shows that the consulting price is the result of Nash equilibrium in one-game model, and the profit distribution factor β value is within the acceptable range, and the profit gained after alliance surpasses that before alliance. Therefore, it is a win-win situation for manufacturer and retailer to form an alliance. Second, the paper describes a campaign between a customer organization and a manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance. The results indicate that the safety pressure made in a customer organization's campaign will increase if the resource a is available. This indicates that having a good relationship with manufacturer-retailer alliance will help a customer organization. Third, the paper analyzes the demand of consumer organizations with regard to manufacturer-retailer alliance. The results indicate that the safety pressure on the "g" manufacturer-retailer alliance can be greater than that on the "b" alliance. The "g" alliance has a higher profit than the "b" alliance when the relationship between consumer organizations and manufacturer-retailer alliance is better in the former than in the latter alliance. When profits gained from competition are more than competition cost, companies will choose to compete. This finding indicates that the desire to compete between customer organization and alliance is determined by expected profits.Finally, the paper analyzes a few customer organizations with regard to target manufacturer-retailer alliance. The results indicate that customer organizations will target the " g" manufacturer-retailer alliance. Weak consumer organizations target at the "g" manufacturer-retailer alliance, whereas strong consumer organizations target at the "b" alliance. We conclude this study with important guidelines for both manufacturer-retailer supply chain alliance and consumers.
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