Earnings management is defined as the behavior that the listed companies use accounting reports or real activities to manipulate a company's periodic reports,which are designed to mislead market investors into believing the company's performance deviation,and maximizing the value or management of the company.In recent years,with the increasing intensity of the external audit,it is more difficult for the listed companies to manipulate the accrued earnings management.Instead,they turn to manipulate real earnings management.Even as a replacement for accrued surplus,it must gain more revenue in the alternative process.Therefore,the Prospect Theory was adopted to analyze the real purpose that listed companies manipulate real earnings management.The panel data of 839 samples during 2007-2012 were used for empirical analysis based on the Prospect Theory in behavioral finance.In the paper,double threshold of earnings management and threshold of market,straight-type relationship of earnings management benefits and risks (cost),and the relationship of dual logarithm were set to test the reasons that the listed companies manipulate real eamings management.The first part analyzes why the listed companies manipulate real earnings management based on the Prospect Theory.In addition,we consider that the management will clarify the gains and losses that real earnings management brings to listed companies,as well as the relationship between benefit (losses) and the cost in order to gain more revenue in the process of manipulating real earnings management.Meanwhile,we analyzed why the listed companies chose to replace accrued earnings management with real earnings management.In the second part,a study design under the Prospect Theory approach is built in which the corresponding regression model includes setting double threshold of earnings management and threshold of market,setting straight-type relationship of earnings management benefits and risks (cost) and the relationship of dual logarithm.Secondly,on the measurement basis of sales control,cost control and production control,we designed the measurement model for real earnings management,as well as a measurement for accrued earnings management based on non-manipulative measurement for accrual revenue.In addition,we introduced the data selection method and data sources.The third part discusses our empirical analysis results.Firstly,the statistical analysis shows that the listed companies using the real earnings management replaced accrued earnings management during the sample period.Then,the empirical results show that the Prospect Theory can explain the management behavior of real earnings management of listed companies.The benefits and risks are positively correlated with eamings management earnings range,but are negatively correlated with the loss range.Moreover,the coefficient relationship of benefits interval is gentler than that of the loss interval.The paper also found that although the accrued earnings management and real earnings management exhibit the same relationship of benefits and risks,the coefficient relationship of benefit interval is steeper than that of the loss interval,indicating that the real purpose of the listed companies using real earnings management to replace accrued earnings management is to pursue more stable interest revenue.Finally,based on the findings presented,we believe that more attention needs to be spent on real earnings management behavior of the listed companies from behavioral finance perspective.%本文利用2007-2012年间839个样本组成的面板数据,依据行为金融学中的“前景理论”,在设定盈余管理双重阈值与市场阈值、盈余管理收益与风险(成本)的直线型关系与双对数型关系的基础上,实证检验了上市公司进行真实盈余管理的原因.研究发现,前景理论可以对中国上市公司真实盈余管理行为进行解释:在盈余管理盈利区间,收益与风险呈现出显著地正相关关系;在损失区间,收益与风险表现为显著地负相关关系;并且,收益区间的系数关系要平缓于损失区间.同时,本文研究还发现,上市公司利用真实盈余管理替代应计盈余管理的真实目的在于追逐更为稳定的盈余收益.
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