本文突破现有经典博弈论研究的完全理性假设,认为上市公司管理层和外部审计是有限理性博弈方,将演化博弈论应用在上市公司舞弊行为的分析和治理上.在建立和求解模型的基础之上,理论上解释了上市公司管理层群体和外部审计群体在四种不同环境下的博弈过程和演化趋势.四种不同演化环境下的最终演化均衡点不尽相同,通过分析四种不同环境之间的联系,得出达到舞弊稳定状态的形成机理,解释了上市公司管理层舞弊倾向的影响因素,从而为上市公司管理舞弊行为控制提供更具有针对性的建议.对管理层的治理对策决定了是否能从根源上防范舞弊的发生,对于外部审计的治理措施决定了是否能充分发挥其外部监督纠错的职责.%In securities market,management fraud can cause serious economic losses.Corruption practices of the listed companies not only bring discontent but also cause panic on people participating in the stock market.If government does not take steps to control the listed companies promptly and effectively,they will continue to breed corruption practices,which will not only make investors,creditors and other stakeholders suffered from significant losses,but also seriously jeopardize the orderly development of capital markets as well as social stability.Therefore,this study investigates the formation mechanism and countermeasures for management fraud,and how to protect the interests of relevant stakeholders.Based on the existing research about the formation mechanism of management fraud,this article tries to address the past hypothesis limitations on the traditional game theory,and apply the bounded rationality game theory to build an appropriate model to analyze the management of the listed companies,and the external audit of game dynamic changes,strategic choices,trends and stable state,as well as propose appropriate countermeasures and steps.The first part describes the analysis of existing research on the management of fraud both at home and abroad.The western studies on management fraud mainly researched management fraud abroad.These studies have focused on motivation,signs,identification,treatment,and prevention of management fraud.Compared to the researches of management frauds abroad,domestic researches on fraud lag behind in those studies abroad.Some domestic scholars use game theory methods to analyze the formation of fraud.These studies interpreting fraud from the aspects of game theory provide a new perspective.However,because of static game and dynamic game more demanding basic strict assumptions,these studies are doomed to have certain limitations.The second part discusses how to build an evolutionary game model for management fraud.Firstly,based on the basic idea of evolutionary game model,and with their own behavioral characteristics of both external audit and the listed companies,this article makes four basic assumptions.According to four-point basic assumptions,we analyzed possible states between the listed companies and external audit during the process of the game and obtain the game payoff matrix.Then,we begin to solve the equilibrium point of the evolutionary game.We firstly solve the replicated dynamic equations of the management of the listed companies and obtain the phase diagram.In addition,we obtain the replicated dynamic equations of the external audit groups and obtain the corresponding phase diagram.Due to different λ.and η,we obtain four trends of the evolutionary game.The third part discusses the detailed analyses of four different environments.When λ equals to the discrepancy between the payoff management of the listed companies,these companies would provide false financial statements.These companies would provide real financial statements,when the extemal audit provides standard unqualified opinions.When η equals to the deviation between the payoff,an external audit would provide a standard unqualified opinion.A nonstandard unqualified opinion will be provided when management has provided false financial statements.Due to the four different trends produced by different parameters,they can describe four different evolutionary processes and results.Those different parameters represent different game environment,and there are also some correlations among these four trends.By analyzing the trends and equilibrium points of the four different trends of the evolution,as well as the connection among four different environments,the fourth part discusses countermeasures and suggestions of management fraud.Countermeasures against the management include the establishment of a listed company fraud early warning system,the enforcement of the supervision department to detect corrupt practices,and completion of the laws to govern the fraud of the listed companies.Countermeasures against external audit include improvement of external auditors' professional competence,enhancement of the strength of supervision departments to investigate fraud,improvement on the securities market laws and regulations as well as the external audit work ethic.Moreover,countermeasures can also increase the reward for external audit rightly pointing out the management fraud practice.The fifth part summarizes drawbacks of the analyses in this article and point out the direction and continuous researches needed to be done.Whether management fraud will occur or not is not just a game between two parties,but also involves many stakeholders,such as regulators and general stock market investors.In summary,this article removes the entirely rational economic man assumption and applies the evolutionary game theory to analyze the listed companies' frauds and countermeasures by assuming that both managements of the listed companies and external audit have bounded rationality.This article explains the evolutionary process of the game between managements of the listed companies and external audit in four different environments.The article also analyzes the relation among the four environments and illustrates the formation mechanism of management fraud,which explains the effect factors of management traud and provides direct countermeasure against them.
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