政府补贴机制下的逆向供应链演化博弈研究

摘要

运用演化博弈的基本原理分析了在政府补贴机制下逆向供应链中制造商与回收商合作行为的演化过程。研究得到制造商与回收商达成合作的两个充要条件分别是：博弈双方选择＂合作＂可获的收益大于其＂不合作＂时所获的收益;政府给予的补贴额度不小于制造商的合作成本。随后通过数值模拟对相关结论进行了验证,并探讨了补贴额度对制造商和回收商的合作行为的影响。就政府如何加强逆向供应链中制造商与回收商之间的合作关系提出了相应的政策建议。%This paper uses evolutionary game theory to analyse the evolutionary process of manufacturers and collectors in the reverse supply chain based in the government subsidy mechanism.Two necessary and sufficient conditions for the game members＇ cooperation are obtained.The one is that cooperation of the two sides of the game can bring more profits than noncooperation.The other one is that the subsidies given by government are not less than the cooperation costs of the manufacturers.And then the paper verifies the above-mentioned conditions by numerical simulation,and analyses the effects of amount of subsidies on the cooperative behavior of manufacturers and recyclers.Finally,the paper provides some policy recommendations on how the government to strengthen the cooperative relations between manufacturers and collectors in the reverse supply chain.