公私合营（PPP）模式在基础设施建设项目中已得到了广泛的应用，合理的政府担保对促成政府部门和投资者协议的达成起到至关重要的作用。政府担保实质上是一种看跌期权，然而该提供多少担保，如何使项目风险在政府部门和投资者之间得到合理的分配成为了决定项目成败的关键因素之一。在实物期权理论基础上，采用讨价还价博弈理论，基于政府部门和投资者不同的风险偏好，对政府担保的期权价值进行了分配，同时建立了 PPP 项目超额收益分配原则。数值模拟说明投资者的风险偏好与政府提供的担保量呈负相关，与超额收益分配呈正相关。%The public-private partnership(PPP)mode has been widely applied in infrastructure construction project. Reasonable government guarantee plays a crucial role in the achievement of agreement between government parties and investment parties. Essentially,government guarantee is a kind of put option. However, how much guarantees should be provided and how to allocate risk between the government agency and investment bodies properly have become one of the key factors which determine the success or failure of the project. Based on the different risk preference coefficient between public sectors and investors,the theory of real option and the theory of bargaining game have been applied to assign the option value between two parties as well as to establish the PPP project’s excess return distribution principle. Numerical simulations illustrate that the risk preference of investment sector has a negative relationship with government guarantee and positive correlated with distribution of excess income.
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