基于委托代理模型的建筑工程激励合同机制研究

摘要

在工程项目建设中，为解决由于业主与承包商之间信息的不对称而引发的道德风险问题，运用信息经济学中的委托代理理论，在考虑使用CPIF合同的同时，通过建立业主与承包商之间的激励合同模型，从承包商的努力程度方面构建了成本函数和生产函数，求出了业主的最优激励标准以及相应承包商的最优努力程度，阐明了业主方在签订合同时的最优激励机制，为业主通过在合同中设置激励措施更好地管理承包商提供参考，并通过具体算例说明该机制的正确性以及与实际情况之间的吻合性。%In order to solve the problem of moral hazard caused by information asymmetry between owners and contractors on construction projects,based on the principal agent theory of information economics,considering the using of CPIF contract,the paper established an incentive contract model between the employer and contractors,and built the cost function and the production function in terms of efforts,we get the optimal incentive standard of the owners and optimal effort level of the contractors,and clarified the optimal incentive mechanisms when the owner sign the contracts,In order to provide a reference for the owners through setting incentives in the contracts. Finally,the article illustrated the correctness of the mechanism by specific examples and the consistency as well as the actual situation.