Security analysis of the certificateless signature scheme proposed by Guo L L, et al. (Guo L L, Lin C L, Zhang S Y. Attack and improvement for certificateless signature scheme. Computer Engineering, 2012, 38( 16): 134 - 137, 141) showed that the scheme was insecure against public key replacement attack. An improved scheme which can resist public key replacement attack was proposed. The scheme was proved to be existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity attacks in random oracle model, and the security was reduced to computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Compared with other certificateless signature schemes based on bilinear pairing, the improved scheme has better computational efficiency.%对郭玲玲等(郭玲玲,林昌露,张胜元.针对一类无证书签名方案的攻击及改进.计算机工程,2012,38(16):134-137,141)提出的无证书签名方案进行安全性分析,结果表明方案不能抵抗公钥替换攻击.为此,提出了一种改进方案.在随机预言机模型下证明了改进方案对自适应选择消息和身份攻击是存在性不可伪造的,其安全性可归约为计算Diffie-Hellman问题.与其他基于双线性对的无证书签名方案相比,改进方案具有较高的运算效率.
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