首页> 中文期刊> 《工业安全与环保 》 >安全管理中“重处罚轻激励”问题的博弈分析

安全管理中“重处罚轻激励”问题的博弈分析

             

摘要

针对我国各行各业安全管理中存在“重处罚轻激励”问题,将博弈理论运用于安全管理者和员工间的激励机制,得出“安全管理者和员工都需要激励,激励运用在安全管理中可以有效的强化员工的安全行为,弱化不安全行为,从而更有利于安全生产”的结论。再通过对违章员工和安全管理者双方混合策略的博弈分析,得出“若要降低员工违章发生率,只加重违章员工的处罚,短期可以抑制违章率,长期反而会使安全管理者变得懒惰不履行职责,因此必须同时加强对安全管理者的激励管理”的结论。最终得出“激励是一种有效的安全管理方法,而处罚作为一种负激励,使用时需要注重其力度”的结论。%Currently there exist the problem that incentive is lighter than punishment in Chinese enterprise safety manage -ment .In this paper ,firstly the basic principles of game theory are applied in incentive mechanism between safety managers and employees ,finding out that “both safety managers and employees need incentives ,the use of incentive in safety management can effectively strengthen safety behaviors of the staffs and weaken the unsafe behaviors ,and so it can help to safety produc-tion ” .Then through the game analysis of mixed strategy of both the violators against the rules and safety managers ,it reach-es such conclusions that “to reduce the incidence rate of violation ,only adding the punishment to the violators can lower the incidence rate of violation in the short - term ,but in the long - term ,the safety managers will become lazy and do not fulfill their responsibilities and so the incentive management must be also strengthened to the safety managers ” .Finally ,it finds out such conclusions that “incentive is an effective safety management ,and punishment as a negative incentive ,we must fo-cus on its intensifying when it is used” .

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