In a "company + farmer" mode of agriculture, the participation of leading companies, the degree of effort of farmers and the production capacity influence the success of this mode. If companies participate in agricultural tasks, whether farmers will try their best to fulfill their tasks and how companies design incentives to encourage farmers to complete agricultural tasks better and create higher output value are studied. Under the condition of information asymmetry, the principal-agent model between companies and farmers is established to study the impact of the company's participation in investment behavior and farmers' output value capacity on the incentive intensity, effort and income. The research shows that the involvement of the company can promote the efforts of farmers and the incentive coefficient will increase, but when it reaches a certain level, the growth rate will slow down. The output value of farmers will stimulate the enthusiasm of their work and they can achieve higher reward; if the ability of farmers' output value is high, it's more likely to attract the company's involvement. If companies actively participate in agricultural tasks, income will increase; the other hand, the companies' earnings are decreased. Finally, the relevant conclusions are verified by a numerical simulation.%在农业"公司+农户"模式中,龙头公司的参与投入程度、农户的努力程度、生产能力等因素影响着该模式是否成功.本文研究在该模式中,公司参与投入到农业任务,农户是否会努力完成任务,以及公司如何设计奖励以激励农户更好地完成农业任务,创造更高的产值.因此,在信息不对称条件下,建立公司与农户间的委托代理模型,研究公司的参与投入行为和农户的产值能力对激励强度、努力程度和收益的影响.研究发现,公司的参与投入能促使农户努力,且激励系数也会增长,但到达某一程度时,会减缓增长速度;农户的产值能力能激发其努力工作的积极性,并为其获得更高的奖励;农户的产值能力越高,越能吸引公司的参与投入.公司积极参与农业任务,收益会提高;反之,公司的收益受损.最后通过数值仿真,验证相关结论.
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