基于消费群体绿色物流偏好的政企进化博弈分析

摘要

Government,enterprises and consumer group are necessary elements to drive the activites of green logistic, and the popularity degree of green logistic largely depends on the results of the tripartite game. In this paper,an evolutionary game model was established according to the strategy between government and enterprises ,and cost-benefit perspective matrixes were established based on two different green logistic preferences of consumer group. The replication dynamic formula was applied to analysis the equilibrium of model and seven kinds of ESS were obtained. The research shows that consumers’green logistic preferences will change the proportion of government and enterprises which implement strategies of green logistic. Government can force firms to put forward strategies of green logistic by increasing the penalty costs,green consciousness and raising environmental awareness of consumer group.%政府、企业和消费群体是实现绿色物流的必要主体，绿色物流普及程度取决于这三方的相互博弈。根据政企之间的策略组合建立了进化博弈模型，从消费群体绿色物流偏好为喜好的角度建立成本效益矩阵；利用复制动态公式对模型进行均衡分析，得到4个进化稳定策略（ESS）。并以新能源汽车为例进行研究：消费群体绿色物流偏好会改变实施绿色物流策略的政府和企业比例；政府可以通过增加惩罚成本、绿色补贴和提高消费群体绿色环保意识促使企业实施绿色物流政策。