Punishment or reward? Strategies of stakeholders in the quality of photovoltaic plants based on evolutionary game analysis in China

摘要

The quality of photovoltaic (PV) plants is one of the main barriers to the future adoption of PV-generated electricity, which is largely dependent on the strategies of stakeholders. Most studies analyze this issue from a technical perspective while ignoring the effects of the stakeholders. Hence, this paper analyzes the evolutionary trajectories of the government, contractors, and investors by establishing evolutionary game models under quality assurance and revenue-sharing contracts that stipulate punishments and rewards. The results show that the government has no direct effect on the quality of PV plants. Under a quality assurance contract, the quality of PV plants depends only on improvements in operations and maintenance (O&M), whereas, under a revenue-sharing contract, it depends both on development and O&M. A parameter analysis classifies the influencing parameters under the revenue-sharing contract into three types. The stakeholders' initial willingness is a subjective parameter; solar energy resources, unit revenue, development costs, and O&M costs are objective parameters; the revenue-sharing ratio is an indirect parameter. Recommendations are made for the promotion of investments by the government and the PV industry.(c) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.