2013年下半年以来,大客户信用风险持续暴露,成为区域经济金融稳定的重要影响因素.本文通过博弈分析并结合典型案例研究后认为,大客户已经成为某种意义上的银行"授信公地",每单家银行为追求各自最大利益,非理性地进入或增加对大客户授信.单体理性形成对客户过度授信和风险难以管控的"合成谬误",往往诱致企业盲目融资和产业扩张,最终因宏观经济变化或跨产业管理能力不足,涉足民间投融资而资金链断裂,导致"公地毁灭".授信"公地悲剧"提供了研究大客户授信风险形成中银行发展导向扭曲、考核激励机制扭曲和银企关系扭曲的经济理论视角,可以为业者提供从机制层次研究探索大客户信用风险管控的思路,帮助其守好系统性、区域性风险的防控底线,推动银行业更好地支持实体经济的发展.%Since the second half of 2013, credit risks of large customers of banks continued to be disclosed, which has become an important factor influencing regional economic and financial stability. Through game-theory analysis illustrated with typical cases, this paper explains why large customers became the "credit commons" of banks. Each bank irrationally increases credit of large customers so that to maximize their profits. This in turn makes monomer rationality into "fallacy of composition" and finally leads to excessive credit. Therefore, industries expand blindly, as enterprises are financing blindly. Eventually, due to the changing of macroeconomic environment, insufficient cross-industry management ability and getting involved in the underground finance, the fund chain breaks, which lead to "commons destruction". The "tragedy of commons" on large customers' credit provides a reasonable perspective on the study of twisted orientation in bank development, incentive mechanism and the relationship between banks and enterprises. It also helps to find methods to control large customer credit risks, prevent systemic and regional risks, and spur banks to support the real economy more effectively.
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