代理冲突、财务信息披露质量与过度投资的实证检验

摘要

Using non financial listed companies from 2009 to 2014 as the samples, this paper brings the financial information dis-closure quality, agency conflicts and over-investment into one framework to make an empirical study. The results show that both the agency problem between shareholders and management and that between controlling and minority shareholders will lead to over-investment of the enterprises. The financial information disclosure quality will restrain the agency problem, that is, with the improvement in the quality of financial information disclosure, the agency cost will be reduced, which will reduce the influence of agency cost on over-investment.%内容提本文以2009年—2014年间的非金融上市公司为样本，将财务信息披露质量、代理冲突与过度投资纳入同一研究框架进行实证研究。结果发现：公司的股东与经营者之间以及公司的控股股东与中小股东之间的两类委托代理问题均会造成企业的过度投资；而财务信息披露质量对代理问题具有抑制作用，即随着财务信息披露质量的提高，公司的代理成本将会下降；财务信息披露质量的提高能降低代理成本对过度投资的影响。