信息对称条件下环境污染第三方治理显性激励研究

摘要

针对环境污染第三方治理激励机制尚不完善的现实困境,选取环境污染第三方治理过程中政府购买环境服务的"委托治理服务"模式作为研究对象,具体采用假设驱动方法,基于委托代理理论,运用博弈理论构建信息对称情况下环境污染第三方治理委托代理模型,探讨环境污染第三方治理过程中委托方(政府)与代理方(环保服务公司)的显性激励问题,解释第三方环保服务公司综合实力等对最佳激励强度和政府投资人期望收入的影响,依据博弈结果给出改进环境污染第三方治理激励的一点启示.%In view of the fact that the incentive mechanism of third-party governance of environmental pollution is not per-fect, the model of "entrusted governance service" purchased by the government in the process of third-party governance of envi-ronmental pollution is taken as the research object. Based on the principal-agent theory and hypothesis-driven method, the principal-agent model of third-party environmental pollution control is constructed by game theory. The explicit incentives of the principal (government) and the agent (environmental protection service company) in the third-party environmental pollution treatment under the condition of symmetrical information are discussed. The influence of the comprehensive strength of the third party environmental protection service company on the optimal incentive intensity and the expected income of government investors are explained. Based on the game results, some enlightenment is given to improve the incentive of third party environmental pollu-tion control.