基于合作博弈的环保设备选择成本分摊问题研究

摘要

环保设备往往无法完全治理污染,导致生产企业不仅要承担环保设备的购置成本,还要交纳未治理污染产生的排污费。越先进的环保设备污染治理率越高,但越先进的环保设备购置成本也就越高。本文将环保设备的购置成本与排污费结合起来,应用合作博弈理论,将环保设备选择问题构造为成本分摊博弈。在环保设备污染治理能力足够大的假设下,该成本分摊博弈的核非空,具有次可加性、凹性等性质,并讨论了核、夏普利值等解。%Environmental environment facilities are often unable to completely treat pollution,which leads manufacturing enterprises to bear the purchasing cost of environmental protection facilities at the same time pay pollution discharge fees due to untreated pollution.Pollution could be treated better with more advanced environment facilities,but more advance facilities cost more.This paper combines the purchasing cost of environmental protection facilities with pollution discharge fee,and applies cooperative game theory to turn the selection of environmental protection facilities into cost allocation game.Under the assumption that treatment capacity of environmental protection facilities is large enough,the core of cost allocation game is non-empty,which features subadditivity and concave.Moreover,core and Shapley value are discussed.