高管激励与现金流操控关系及调节作用研究

摘要

This paper explores the reasons of cash flow manipulation from the perspective of senior executive incentive of list⁃ed companies, and classifies senior executive incentive into explicit incentive and implicit incentive. Meanwhile, the paper, taking three types of report motivation of cash flow manipulation as moderating variables, probes into whether the relationship between senior executive incentive and cash flow manipulation will be affected by the report motivation factors. After making an empirical test on the data of Chinese A-share market from 1999 to 2012, we find that senior executive incentive stimulates cash flow manipulation, the proportion of senior incentive shareholding restrains cash flow manipulation, implicit gains of se⁃nior executive reduce cash flow manipulation, and companies with a high senior executive turnover rate breed easily cash flow manipulation. We also notice that three types of report motivation moderate the relationship between senior executive incentive and cash flow manipulation significantly.%文章从上市公司高管激励的视角探求公司现金流操控行为产生的原因，具体将高管激励划分为显性激励和隐性激励，同时以现金流操控的三类报告动机为调节变量，探究高管激励与现金流操控的关系是否受到报告动机因素的干扰。通过对我国A股上市公司1999-2012年数据实证检验，发现高管薪酬刺激了现金流操控，高管持股比例能抑制现金流操控，高管隐性收益减少现金流操控，频繁的高管变更易滋生现金流操控；三类报告动机均显著调节了高管激励与现金流操控的关系。