从合作博弈论视角分析了工程科技合作创新收益合理分配的问题，运用Shapley值法对创新联盟的收益进行初次分配；基于模糊综合评价法（FAHP）从科技创新角色重要性、合作意识、成本投入、企业实力、承担风险等量化评价各创新成员的实际贡献率，据此修正初次分配Shapley值。用工程实际创新案例进行了计算分析，结果表明改进的分配方法合理地提高了核心创新单位和承担风险大的单位的收益，分配结果与成员在联盟中的价值相匹配，有利于创新联盟的稳定，具有可操作性和实用性，可为合作创新收益分配提供理论依据与方法。%The perspective of the distribution of engineering science and technology cooperation innovation income rea-sonable question from cooperative game theory, using the Shapley value of proceeds of the innovation alliance to primary distribution based on FAHP method;the actual contribution from technology innovation role, cooperation consciousness, cost investment, enterprise strength, risk, quantitative evaluation of the members of the rate of innovation, correction of initial distribution Shapley this value. The calculation and analysis are carried out by case engineering innovation, results show that the improved method of reasonable distribution to improve the core innovation units and bear the risk of large units of the income distribution, the members in alliance with the value of the match, is conducive to innovation alliance stability, maneuverability and practicability, which can provide theoretical basis and methods for the cooperation innova-tion income distribution.
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