This paper studies the moderating effect of different ultimate controller of listed companies on the relationship between the quantity and the maturity structure of bank loans and their investment behavior in order to reveal the integrative effects of the shareholder-creditor agency conflict and the bank loans as a governance mechanism on the investments. Studies have shown that: i) in general, there is a significant negative correlation between bank lending and investment spending, and short-term borrowing can exert a more binding force than the long-term borrowing for investment expansion;ii) whether the ultimate controller is state or non-state, the short-term debt can constraint the investment expansion more obvious than that of the long-term loan, but in the companies ultimately controlled by the country, the long-term borrowing show the more incentive for the over-investment; iii) the short-term borrowings play a role in binding in companies controlled by the central government, but the long-term does not; iv) there isn't significant relationship between short-term borrowings and investment behaviors, but there is a significant relation between long-term debt and over-investment.%主要研究不同终极控制人上市公司的银行贷款数量和期限结构对其投资行为的影响,以揭示股东-债权人代理冲突和银行贷款作为治理机制在公司投资方面所带来的综合后果.研究结果表明,银行贷款与投资支出显著负相关,短期贷款比长期贷款对投资扩张的约束力更大;无论是国家终极控制还是非国家终极控制的上市公司中,短期贷款对投资扩张起到明显的制约作用,但是在国家终极控制的上市公司中,长期贷款对决策者产生了更大的过度投资激励;中央终极控制的上市公司中短期贷款发挥了约束作用,长期贷款作用并不明显;地方终极控制的上市公司中短期贷款的约束作用不显著,但是其长期贷款产生了明显的过度投资激励.
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