首页> 外文期刊>中国工商管理研究前沿:英文版 >Voluntary disclosures and peer-to-peer lending decisions:Evidence from the repeated game
【24h】

Voluntary disclosures and peer-to-peer lending decisions:Evidence from the repeated game

机译:自愿披露和点对点贷款决策:重复博弈的证据

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       
机译:This study investigates the effect of voluntary disclosures on lending decisions in the repeated game.Using a unique dataset from a peer-to-peer lending platform,Hppdaiw ipoipaidai),we document that voluntary disclosures in the repeated game play a stronger role in promoting funding success than those in the one-shot game.We argue that voluntary disclosures improve the bidding activity in the repeated game through which they increase funding success.In addition,the greater impact of voluntary disclosures on funding success in the repeated game only holds for loans without a personal guarantee attribution.Our extended results suggest that the subjective voluntary disclosures in the repeated game have greater information content only when borrowers have a successful borrowing experience.We also point out that voluntary disclosures in the repeated game are associated with a lower probability of default.Our results are robust to the Heckman two-step estimation that addresses the self-selection effect and a specification designed to rule out the alternative explanation from reputation in the repeated game.Our study provides new insights into the real effects of costless,voluntary and unverifiable disclosures on lending decisions.

著录项

获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号