In the new normal of economy, the characteristic of water resources that are quasi-public goods which have more important management value.How to upgrade water resources management level based on market and administration in order to better serve two 'hundred-year objective' has the importantly theoretical and practical significance.Water rights trading system is of great technical importance to raise the usage efficiency of water resources and to solve the conflict between human and water through market and administrative methods;thus, how to build pricing mechanisms of water rights transaction that accords with the situations of China has become the key technology to realize water rights trading system.Therefore, this papers introduces an ecological and economic theory to set up a water rights value measuring model and two-level dynamic game model under quasi-market used by cooperative game further.The model aim at pricing water rights transaction that includes government,company and the public.In addition, this model is composed of differential game model of buyer government, seller government and Nash-Bargaining model between buyer government and water company.And then solved by Hamilton-Jacobi-Bell-man method, it enduces the equilibrious water price interval of water rights transaction.We takes Pingxiang City, Jiangxi Province as an example to do empirical research on water rights transaction.The analysis results show that K which means coordination ability of governments at higher levels and β which stands for water demand coefficient have a significant impact on equilibrious water price and positive correlation exists.In Pingxiang City, coordination ability of higher level governments has more obvious impacts than water demand coefficient because water consumption mainly reflects the requirement of medium-and long-term development stages.Secondly, the equilibrious water price which changes from fast to slow and then fast with the increase of K, accords with the logical function distribution in general;moreover,the price which slows down gradually with the increase of β , accords with the logarithmic function distribution;furthermore, the roles of market and administration in water rights transaction have stabilized state and neither are indispensable.Finally, the water rights transaction price of Nash-Bargaining model increases with the increasing of bargaining capability coefficient.It shows that the cooperative relations between government and company has direct influences on water price.%在经济新常态背景下,水资源的准公共产品特征具有更加重要的管理价值,如何依托市场与行政的两手发力,提升我国水资源管理水平,更好地服务于"两个百年"奋斗目标,具有十分重要的理论与现实意义.水权交易制度是利用市场与行政手段提高水资源利用率,解决人水冲突的重要技术手段,如何在准市场条件下构建符合我国国情的水权交易定价机制已成为实现水权交易制度的核心技术.因此,针对政府-企业-公众等多利益相关者参与下的水权交易定价问题,本文引入生态经济学理论构建了水权价值测度模型,进而引入合作博弈理论,构建了准市场条件下的水权交易双层动态博弈定价模型,主要包括买方政府和卖方政府的微分博弈模型,以及买方政府与水务公司的Nash-Bargaining合作定价模型,运用HJB条件求解多利益相关者合作框架下的水权交易均衡水价空间,进而以江西省萍乡市水权交易实践为例开展实证研究,结果表明:均衡水价主要受上级政府协调能力k、水量需求系数β影响,且均为正相关,针对萍乡实践而言,由于水量需求主要体现在中长期发展规划阶段,上级政府协调能力显著性强于水量需求系数;均衡水价随着上级政府协调能力k值增大呈现由快转慢再转快的趋势,整体服从逻辑函数分布,均衡水价随着水量需求系数β的增大呈现由快转慢趋势,整体服从对数函数分布,针对萍乡实践而言,水权交易中市场与行政力量的两手发力存在稳定状态,二者缺一不可;随着议价能力系数提高,Nash-Bargaining 的水权交易价格随之升高,表明政府与公司之间的合作关系对水价具有直接的影响能力.
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