Eisenhower and the internal focus: The persistence of traditional thought in American national security formulation.

摘要

This dissertation argues that a certain set of concerns, organized around the "internal focus" or fear that the "republic" was fragile, influenced the national security thinking of both the pre-war conservative isolationists in America First and the early Eisenhower administration. The "internal focus" was the belief, common to many groups, that the American republic could be destroyed from within by a variety of changes. The conservative isolationists identified the "republic" with their concepts of democracy and capitalism. They believed that the effort necessary to fight the war in Europe would lead to centralization and militarization, thus undermining the "republic." They relied on the oceans for "free security," a defense which would not lead to militarization and centralization.;As president, Dwight Eisenhower attempted to balance similar fears of internal threats to the republic against the fear of the foreign threat from the Soviet Union. In an attempt to answer both fears, he embraced massive nuclear retaliation as a means of restoring "free security," a defense which would not undermine the republic from within. His administration also saw "liberation" as a means to end the Cold War before it could lead to irreversible changes within the United States. Recognizing the degree to which Eisenhower and some of his advisors feared these internal threats allows us to explain anomalies such as Secretary of State Dulles's threat of "agonizing reappraisal." It also sheds new light on Eisenhower's response to individual crises from Indochina to Iran to Guatemala.;This approach tempers the once-common view of Eisenhower as an internationalist. It also expands our understanding of the pre-World War Two isolationists. Finally, it displays unexpected continuities between American national security thinking before World War Two and in the early Cold War.