Confronted with bloody civil conflict, the UN, if it acts, often defaults to imposing an arms embargo. Yet while arms embargoes have been increasingly imposed since the end of the Cold War, there remains significant disagreement about the impact and effectiveness of arms embargoes for ending, or at the very least limiting, violent conflict.;This study analyzes the impact of UN arms embargoes on internal conflict. It seeks to understand what role UN arms embargoes can play in ending or limiting violent conflict. It does so by both closely examining the theory and assumptions of how arms embargoes ostensibly work and analyzing with statistics and through case studies the impact of past and current arms embargoes on civil conflict.;Arms embargoes may have little effect, because the Security Council underestimates the challenges of influencing combatants and relies on a flawed theory of the impact and utility of arms embargoes. Impartial arms embargoes have rarely succeeded in preventing a sufficient re-supply of arms to all participants to sustain the embargoed conflict. Thus, the military conflict drags on interminably. The hope then is the arms embargo may motivate the combatants to agree to a peace settlement. But without a significant change in the military dynamics, there will seldom be a change in the status quo political calculations of the combatants and thus little motivation to negotiate meaningfully and compromise. The solution---absent other assertive action---may be the imposition of a partial embargo. While a partial embargo cannot stop all supplies to the embargoed force or forces, it will have an impact on the relative supply of arms and could thus help change the relative balance of forces. This in turn would change the political calculations of the combatants, and may help promote a settlement.;Statistical analysis suggests that impartial arms embargoes do prolong conflict. Case studies of four UN arms embargoes, Bosnia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia demonstrates that impartial arms embargoes do not impede the flow of arms sufficiently to end the war. In fact, in some instances the arms embargo may do more harm than good. More importantly, in the three cases where the conflict has ended (Bosnia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) it was the imposition of a formal or de facto partial that helped bring an end to those wars.;The dissertation does not assert that imposing a partial arms embargo is a solution to all civil conflict. But the reason the Security Council continues to implement arms embargoes inappropriately is because it often fails to understand the possible and real impact of arms embargoes. Therefore arms embargoes are poorly implemented and rarely part of a clear strategy to restore peace and stability to the embargoed country or region. Arms embargoes can be an important and powerful tool for the Security Council for dealing with a humanitarian crisis, but only if they are an element of a comprehensive strategy that realistically appraises the difficulty of promoting peace. If implemented poorly or without careful analysis, arms embargoes may often do more harm than good.
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