The Double Relation: The Application of Rousseau's Ontology to His Social and Political Philosophy.

摘要

Rousseau’s Emile provides a rich ontology for the adult, socialized self. This ontology, which resembles both Cartesian and phenomenological ways of thinking, has not received sufficient attention from scholars. My first chapter features a detailed reconstruction of Rousseau’s ontology. It addresses classic concerns like the mind-body union as well as Rousseau-focused issues, including the formative role of sentiments in self-understanding. Discussion centers on what Rousseau calls the “double relation:” the self's relation to itself and to others. These relations and their interaction structure the self, and being a self is realizing and negotiating these relations, or so I argue.;I examine ineradicable tensions that follow from Rousseau’s ontology, especially between dependence on others and self-determination, that is, how the self can freely choose its own way of life while it exists in a social world that bears much authority over such choices. I argue that freedom is not independence from others; instead, it is depending on others such that the self can give and receive respect and esteem without its self-expression being controlled by the opinions of others. Rousseauian freedom is (1) being master of one’s self-understanding by protecting one’s ontological constitution from corruption by outside influences, and (2) determining how to act via laws, founded in sentiments, that arise spontaneously from the double relation.;Rousseau uses the social bond to elaborate the self's dependence relations on others. This bond forms a people as a unique cultural group, not just as a nation under laws. I describe how the Rousseauian social bond is produced and maintained, and I argue that it is grounded in the self’s sentiments. Because it derives from the self, the social bond is a form of self-expression. In a wellformed social bond, the self partakes in reciprocity of respect and esteem with others, and on the basis of such reciprocity a people can be united without compromising individual freedom.;Rousseau’s political philosophy also benefits from engaging his ontology. The general will, I argue, is grounded in the double relation as a form of self-expression. After locating the source of the general will in sentiments that shape the self’s structure, I show that its domain of application is the common interest: protection of person, property, and freedom. To be legitimate, laws must conform to both these limits and a second order of constraints: laws must respect the social bond and be useful, equitable, legitimate, and stable. When legitimate laws and a free people come together, individual freedom is possible. Social contracts are difficult to achieve, but they are not utopian.;My final chapter returns to the concept of freedom. My analysis shows that freedom is not just social and political, but has epistemological and ontological forms as well. In every form of freedom, the self determines itself in some way, either in its ontological structure, which admits much variation, or in its practical life. I argue that these forms provide resources for the self to deal with tensions in its life which cannot be eradicated, but rather must be managed and whose effects we must live with.