This dissertation is a collection of essays that explore the land assembly problem. Developers are of tasked with assembling or consolidating contiguous pieces properties to carry out a large-scale development. During the assembly process, developers will encounter various hurdles that increase the transactions costs associated with the project. As these costs grow, the viability of the project may be questioned and otherwise beneficial projects may fail to be developed. In my first essay, I use a series of controlled laboratory experiments to explore a neglected source of failed assembly: post-development externalities. In it, I demonstrate that externalities lead to lower aggregation in the presence of externalities. Also using laboratory experiments, the second essay shows that inducing competition among prospective landowners is a viable technique to improve assembly rates in an environment where the incentive to be strategic is strong, but with no externalities. In the final essay, I use a new dataset on real estate acquisition for roadway construction, to quantify the effect that bargaining delays have on final transaction prices when the developer has access to eminent domain.
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